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IN 'l'HE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PAUL D. LEVIE, Trustee of
the Paul D. and Rae Levie
Trust dated November 20, 1973:
Plaintiff,

Case No. 16652

vs.
Sevier County, a political
subdivison of the State
of Utah, IVAN MILLS, DEAN c.
NIELSEN, ELMO HERRING,
SCOTT l!Al'lLEY, GRANT OGDEN
T. M. ASHMAN, AHNO BASTIAN,
and N. ANDY WINGET,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS-PLAINTIFFS

STATEMENT OF THE UATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff sued the County Board of Commissioners
seeking a determination that his proposed subdivision plat
satisfies the requirements of the GRF-1 zone and should,
therefore, be approved.
DISPOSITION BY LOWER COURT
Both plaintiff and defendants moved for summary
judgment.

After oral argument, the Court took the motion

under advisement and subsequently granted defendants'
motion.

In a very brief order, the Court determined that

Plaintiff's proposed subdivision plat did not meet the
requirements of the GRF-1 zone.

The Court offered no
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justification for its decision.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the sununary judgment
in favor of defendants.

In addition, plaintiff seeks a

finding of summary judgment in favor of pJ aintiff on the
grounds that, as a matter of law, defendants acted
arbitrarily and capriciously by:

1) not approvin<J plaintiff':

plat which satisfies all of the GRF-1 zone requirements,
and 2) depriving plaintiff of his administrative remedies,
STA'IEJlENT OF FACTS
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-27-1 to l.7-27-27
(1953), the Sevier County Board of Commissioners on July
19, 1965, adopted a Sevier County Zoning Ordinance and
an official zoning map of Sevier County (Hawley deposition,

p. 8).
Article IV, §4-18, of the zoning ordinance
provides:
Subdivision development plan.
The owner or owners of any land of not less than
three (3) acres in area, desiring to subdivide
such land, shall submit to the Planning Commission
a complete devel~.12!!1~~! plan in ac~ordance with
the subdivision regulations of Sevier County.
(Emphasis added)
The only subdivision regulation for the Sevier
County ever enacted by the Board of Commissioners requlates
the subdivison of mountainous and semi-mountainous land
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in the unincorporated territory of the county.

Said sub-

division regulation, according to its terms, does not apply
to plaintiff's application.

This is admitted and acknowledged

by the director of Sevier County Planning and Zoning, Scott
Hawley (Hawley deposition, pp. 9-10).
According to the zoning ordinance and the official
zoning map, plaintiff's subject property is and at all
times has been included in the GRF-1 Grazing, Recreation
and Forestry Zone (R. 60).

Uses permitted in this zone

include "One family dwellings - farm labor dwellings."
Article VIII, 8-5-3 (R. 70), Area Requirements,
of the zoning ordinance provides that:
In order to discourage urbanization in
this zone, an area of not less than three
acres shall be provided and maintained
for each one family and/or two family
dwelling, except that the area of a building
site in a summer homes subdivision may
be reduced to one-half (1/2) acre, when
such subdivision has been approved by the
Planning Commission. For all other
buildings there shall be no minimum area
requirements.
In meetings between the Sevier County Zoning Commission and plaintiff, certain suggestions and requests
were made, such as; that creek lots be set back at least
100 feet from Clear Creek; that no mobile homes be permitted;
and that restrictions be prepared so providing.

It was

also discussed that the means of establishing a home owners
association would be provided for in the restrictive covenants
and that said association would aid or manage the garbage
and trash collection and disposal (plaintiff's deposition,
R.
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A proposed plat map of the deveJopment
was pr epared
and submitted to the Planning and Zoning Commission by the
project engineer, Ray Blackham.

The

plan submitted was

a proposal to develop the area into lots.
be in excess of one-half (1/2) acre

Each lot was to

(R. 52) pursuant to

Zoning Ordinance Article VIII, B-5-3 (R. 70), permitting
such when approved by the Planning Commission.
The proposal was reviewed by defendants in a Sevier
County Zoning Board meeting held March 31, 1976 (R. 61).
At the meeting, which plaintiff attended, no specific objections or findings were made or found by the Board (R. 61).
There were general objections indicating that the County
Attorney did not want the property subdivided.

Standards

for roads were discussed, but no specific requirements
were made or requested.

Problems of school transportation

were also discussed.
Plaintiff's representative, Ray Blackham,appeared
at the Sevier County Commission meeting on April 5, 1976,
where he presented plaintiffs proposal.

After reviewing

the proposal and the planning commission's recommendation
(R. 61), the defendants denied plaintiff's application
(R.

65).

Plaintiff was notified of defendants' decision

of a letter dated April
on or a b ou t May 6 , 1976 , by rece ipt
~
29, 1976, from Devon Polson (R. 66).

The letter was purportia:
I

signed by Scott Hawley.
Plaintiff responded to this denial in letter dated
June 18, 1976, advising the Commissioners that the ap P
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l icant

was desirous of meeting any and all requirements and that
applicant would redesign the subdivision to eliminate any
objections and to conform to any requirements of the zoning
ordinance

(plaintiff's deposition, p. 17).

Plaintiff made

frequent personal and verbal inquiries as to what he needed
to do to obtain approval of the plat, but was given no advice
or information as to requirements that had not been met.
Plaintiff recognized that pursuant§ 8-5-3 (R.70)
of the zoning ordinance, building sites could be reduced
to one-half (1/2) acre lots only if approved by the planning
commission.

In such a case, some discretion was given to

the Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of Commissioners.
Plaintiff, therefore, revised the proposed plat of Clear
Creek Heights and provided for each lot to contain in excess
of three acres, thus

complying fully and completely with

the zoning ordinance ("An area of not less than three acres
shall be provided and maintained for each one family, and/or
two family dwelling.") Plaintiff thereby removed any necessity for
the exercise of discretion on the part of the Board of Commissioners.
After revision of the subdivision plat, it was
again submitted to the Sevier County Board of Commissioners
and plaintiff was advised that the consideration of the
same would be had at a duly scheduled meeting on April
19, 1977, following a public hearing on the adoption of
a proposed new zoning and subdivision ordinance for Sevier
County.
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Plaintiff attended the meeting and, after the discussion on the proposed new ordinance was con c 1 u d ecl , Plainfr:
asked to be heard regarding approval of his subdivision
plat application.

Plaintiff was advised by Mr. Hawley

and by Ken Melaird, who was proposing the new
and zoning ordinance,

subdivis~n

that plaintiff's proposed subdivision

was not permitted in the GRF-1 zone and there was nothing
further to consider.

No formal meeting or discussion on

the question was conducted at that time nor did plaintiff
have an opportunity to be heard.

Plaintiff was not advised

of any formal action taken,either then or at a later
(Hawley deposition p.
p.

29,

ti~

lines 8-12; plaintiff's deposition,

35, lines 5-25).
'rhe Sevier County Planning and Zoning Commission

and Sevier County Commissioners have consistentl',' and repeatec.
refused to give further consideration to the approval of
plaintiff's subdivision

5-25).

(plaintiff's deposition p. 15, lines

The Sevier County Planning and Zoning Commission

and its director,

as well as the County Commissioners,

have consistently refused to give further details or ru~~
for the failure and refusal to approve plaintiff's subdivision plat.
LEGAL ARGU11ENT
POINT

I

DEFENDANTS' REFUSAL TO APPROVE PLAINTIFF'S
SUBDIVISON PLAT, WHICH C0!1PLIES FULLY \HTH
APPLICABLE ZONING ORDINANCES, IS ARBITRARY I'lr;
AND CAPRICIOUS.
THE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAIN ' '
DEFENDANT'S !10'l'ION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
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,.,--

In Na.Yl-or v. Salt Lake City Coro., 17 Utah 2d 300,
410 P.2d 764

(1966), the Utah Supreme Court held that:
In conformity with well established rules
relating to the powers of administrative
bodies, it is to be assumed that they have
some specialized knowledge of the conditions
and the needs upon which the discharge
of their duties depends. Because the law
imooses this dutv orimarilv uoon the Commission,
and because of its oresumed expertise in
fulfilling that responsibility, the court
will not invade the province of the
Commission and substitute its judgment
therefore; nor will it interfere with
the prerogatives of the Commission unless
it is shown to be so clearly in error
that there is no reasonable basis whatsoever to justify it and its action must
therefore be regarded as capricious and
arbitrary.
(emphasis added)

The defendant's refusal to approve plaintiff's
subdivision plat is "so clearly in error that there is
no reasonable basis whatsoever to justify it."

Therefore,

its actions must be "regarded as capricious and arbitrary."
The

Se~ier

County Zoning Ordinance authorizes

nine different zones, one of which is the GRF-1 zone.
A careful analysis of the entire ordinance and the requirements of the GRF-1 zone makes clear the necessity of
defendants' approval of plaintiff's subdivision nlat.
A.

Plaintiffs proposed subdivision plat satisfies

the requirements of the GRF-1 zone.
Zoning ordinances are a limitation on a property
owners rights.

Hence the requirement in Utah--that such

ordinances and regulations should be designed only "for
the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, convenience,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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order, prosperity or welfare of the inhabitants of Utah.
Utah Code Ann.

§

17-27-13

(1953).

Therefore, a zoninq

ordinance, being in derogation of common law prooerty
rights,

should be strictly contrued.

Any ambiguity or

uncertainty should be decided in favor of the property
owner.

Cubby v. Hammond,

68 Ariz,

17, 198 P.2d 114 (194R).

It is clear that under the Sevier Countv 7.oning
Ordinance the regulations incluc.ed as §§ 8-5-2 to 8-5-8,
have been adopted with the express purpose of accomplishinq
the stated objectives and purposes of the GRF-1 zone.
Article VIII,

§

8-5-1 provides:

The objectives of establishing the GRI'-1 Grazinq,
Recreation and Forestry Zone are:
1.

To promote the use of land for forestry,

fish, wildlife and recreational and livestock grazir.:
purposes.
2.

To secure economy in the cost of supplying

police and fire protection, roads and other public
services, and to redue waste from an excessive millli'
of roads.
3.

To preserve insofar as possible, natural

SW

attractions natural vegetations, and other natural
features within the zone.

4.

.
of commercial
and
To prevent the scattering
"~

urban uses into the zone.
5.

To promote sanitation and protect and conser

the water surply and other natural resources·
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6.

To protect

irban development.

-8-

I

Section 8-5-1 then continues:
In order to accomplish th~se objectives and purposes
and to protect the essential characteristics of the
zone, the following regulations shall apply in the
GRF-1 Grazing, Recreation and Forestry Zone: (Emphasis
added)
Sections 8-5-2 to 8-5-8 follow as those regulations
designed to accomplish the objectives of the GRF-1 zone.
Therefore, if the plaintiff can meet the requirements under
§§

8-5-2 to 8-5-8, he should be considered as having satisfied

the stated objectives and purposes of the r,RF-1 zone.
The plaintiff satisfies the § 8-5-2 Use Requirements
Regulation.

His proposed subdivision plat includes one single

family dwelling per lot.
dwellings."

The GRF-1 zone allows "One family

Article II of the Sevier County Zoning Resolution

defines "family" as
An individual or two

(2) or more persons related by
blood, marriage or adoption living together in a dwelling
unit.
Guests in excess of two (2) who pay for meals
or room shall be considered as boarders.
The same article defines a "dwelling" as:
A building or portion thereof designed exclusively
for residential occupancy, but not including hotels,
tourist cabins, and boarding houses.
Article II defines a "one family dwelling" as:

"A detached

building containing only one dwelling unit."
Thus,

§

8-5-2, in conjunction with Article II, expressly

authorizes single family, residential dwellings in a GRF-1
zone.

The plaintiff satisfies this requirements.
The addition of "farm labor dwellings" following "one-

family dwellings" in

§

8-5-2 is confusing and ambiguous.

There is no definition in Article II clarifying "farm-labor
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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dwellings." Therefore,

the court should interpret "farm-lab~:'

dwellings" in favor of the plaintiff land owner as an additu
to and not a qualification of "One-Family Dwelling."
In addition,

the court should note the express

au the:,

tion in § 8-5-2 of the use of "Private summer cottages and
accessory buildings." Contrary to the defendants' argu~M,
the regulation writers distinguished between summer cottaqes
and single-family

residential dwellings, and allowed the use

of both types of dwellings.
Plaintiff satisfies the § 8-5-3 area requiremen~
regulation. Section 8-5-3 requires that "an area of not less

(3) acres shall be provided and maintained fur

than three

each one-family and/or two-family dwelling
§

In addi::

3-5-3 provides that "a subdivision may be reduced to one·

(1/2) acre when such subdivision has been approved by

half

the planning commission."

Thus the planning commission has

!

discretion to allow a subdivision with lots smaller than thr',
(3)

acres as long as they are larger than one-half (1/2) acr'

But the regulations divest the planninq commission of any

discretion in approving subdivisions with lots larger than
three
(3)

(3) acres.

aces,

A subdivision with lots larger than t~~

that otherwise meets the GRF-1 requirements, must

be approved by the county planning and zoning commission.
The Plaintiff's first submitted plan was a proposal
to develop the property into lots, each in excess o

(1/2) acre.

f one-hal'

.
. d.iscre tion and
The defendants exercised
their

rejected the proposal.

However,

·
'ff' s s·cond
the plainti
e
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proposal provided for each lot to contain in excess of three
()) acres.
§

Thus, the plaintiff has strictly complied with

8-5-3 and defendants have no authority to reject the

plaintiff's proposal on this ground.
All of the remaining requirements under the GRF-1
zoning regulations have been met and are not in issue.
Therefore, by satisfying all of the regulations under
§§

8-5-2 to 8-5-8, the "objectives and purposes" of protecting

"the essential characteristics of the GRF-1 zone" are satisfied.
B.

The Sevier County Board of Commissioners has

a Ministerial duty to Approve plaintiff's plat that has
satisfied all of the GRF-1 zone requirements.
Under Utah law, the Sevier County Board of Commissioners
has the authority to zone and regulate the unincorporated
territory within the county.
17-27-9 to 17-27-11 (1953).

Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-27-1,
The Commissioners also have

the authority to enforce the zoning regulations by withholding building permits.

Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-12 (1953).

However, these legislative and administrative powers cannot
be confused.

The county Board of Commissioners has the

power to legislate by adopting zoning ordinances and regulations.
But once having legislated it is then the commissioners'
responsibility to enforce the zoning ordinance and its
regulations.
In Contracts Funding and Mortgage Exchange v. Maynes,
527 P.2d 1073 (Utah 1974), a county Board of Commissioners
ignored this important distintion between their legislation
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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and enforcement functions.

In Maynes, a property owner

attempted to secure a building permit in a section of
the county that was not zoned, having done everything
necessary under the then existing laws.

Instead of grantini

the permit, the County Board of Commissioners passed a
zoning ordinance excluding the property owner's proposal,
The Utah Supreme Court held that the property owner,
m~t

having done everything necessary under existing laws,
have his application approved.

The court explained:

The simple fact is, that a property
owner, having done everything necessary
under existing laws, cannot be expected
to be circumscribed by ex post facto modus
operandi leges, such as zoning ordianances
presuming to upside-down the hour glass.
(id. at 1074).

'

I
Rather than passing ex post facto zoning regulation;,!
the defendants are attempting to block the plaintiff's
application for a building permit using
after the fact legislation.

<l

similar form of

The defendant commissioners

do not cite specific zoning regulation which bar the
plaintiff's application, but simply claim that the plaintiff'
proposed development "is inimical to most, if not all,
of the objectives of this zone."

(see, Defendant' s !lotion

for Summary Judgment)
By discussing, writing, debating and adopting the
h
Sevier County Zoning Ordinance and its regulation t e

commissioners satisfied their legislative function.
time, and in the form of use, area, width, yar d s
health requirements, defendants decided what was

defenc'i

!

At

thot:

and oub)ic
consistent

the <;Rf-1
with, and what was inimical to, the objectives Of
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zone.

By now attempting to define the plaintiff's proposed

development as "inimical to the objectives" of the GRF-1
zone, when the GRF-1 requirements have been satisfied,
the defendant Commissioners are legislating after the fact.
This principle is clearly recognized in other
jurisdictions.

In State ex rel. Ogden v. City of Bellevue,

45 Wash 2d 492, 275 P.2d 899

(1954), the court ruled that

a use permit must issue as a matter of right where the property
owner has complied with the zoning ordinance.

The court

explained:
The discretions premissible in zoning matters
is that which is exercised in adopting the zone
classifications with in the terms, standards,
and requirements pertinent thereto, all of which
must be by general ordinance applicable to all
persons alike.
The acts of administering a zoning
ordinance do not go back to the questions of policy
and discretion which were settled at the time of
the adoption of the ordinance. Administrative
authorities are properly concerned with questions
of compliance with the ordinance, not with its
wisdom. (id. at 902).
See also City of Colorado
Springs v. Street, 81 Colo. 181, 254 P. 440 (1927).
The use, area, width, yards and public health requirements found in Article VIII, §§ 8-5-2 to 8-5-6, were
instituted to accomplish the objectives and purposes of
the GRF-1 zone; and the plaintiff's proposed development
satisfies all of these requirements.

Under these circum-

stances, the defendant commissioners do not have the right,
authority, or power to refuse to approve plaintiff's plat.
By so doing, defendant's actions were capricious and arbitrary.
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POI!n II
THE SEVIER COUN'I'Y BOARD OF COMMISSIONE
1
ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY
~
BY DEPRIVING PLAINTIFF OF' HIS ADllINIS ,
TIVE REMEDIES.
T!I).•

Under Utah law, a developer desiring approval of
a plat must first submit his proposed plat to the Board
of County Commissioners who will then either grant or withhol'
a building permit.
(1953).

Utah Code Ann.

§§

17-21-8, 17-27-12

If a plat is not approved he then can appeal ilie

decision to the Board of Adjustment, provided the Board
of Adjustment has the jurisdiction and power to consider
the case.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-27-15, 17-27-16 (1953).
The plaintiff first sought defendant's approval
of the plat containing one-half (1/2) acre lots.
Board rejected the proposal.

The defenda:

The plaintiff revised the

plat and provided that each lot contain in excess of

thr~

(3) acres, thus fully complying with the zoning ordinance.
The revision of the subdivision plat was again
submitted to defendants, as required by Utah Code Ann.
§§

17-21-8 and 17-21-12. Without the benefit of a formal

meeting, discussion or any formal action, the plaintiff
was informed that his proposed subdivision was not permitted
in a GRF-1 zone.

Plaintiff was not advised of any formal

action taken either then or at a later time.

Rather than

holding a hearing and formally granting or rejectinq the
proposal, the defendant Board has done nothinq.
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I

Section 17-27-16 of the Utah Code provides:
Upon appeals the board of adjustment shall
have the following powers:
(l) To hear and decide appeals where it
is alledged by the appellant that there
is error in any order, requirement decision
or refusal made by any administrative official
or agency based on or made in the enforcement
or the zoning resolution.
(emphasis added)
The Utah Supreme Court explained that § 17-27-16
of the Utah Code is designed "to assure speedy appeal to
the proper tribunal any grievance that a party may have
who is adversed by a decision

of an administrative agency."

(emphasis added) Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 15 Utah
2d 305, 3flB, 392 P.

2d 4fl,

42 (1964).

The Board of Adjustments only has power to hear
appeals based on some affirmative and official action taken
by the Board of County Commissioners.

By refusing to consider

plaintiff's second proposal, the defendant Board did not
and has not made "any order, requirement decision or refusal"
from which plantiff can appeal before the board of adjustment.
Thus, defendants have effectively cut plaintiff off from
his administrative remedy.
The defendant Sevier County Board of Commissioners
as a duty under the law to review plaintiff's proposed
development and either approve or reject it, thereby preserving
his administrative

remedies.

By their refusal to even

consider plaintiff's second proposal they have acted in
direct violation of Utah law. Such action is arbitrary
and ca pr ic ious.
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POINT III
WHETHER DEFENDANTS ACTED ARBITRARILY
AND CAPRICIOUSLY IS A MATERIAL FACT,
SHARPLY DISPUTED, THEREBY MAKING IT
ERROR FOR THE COUR'r TO GRANT SUMMAHY
JUDGMEN'l'.
The question of whether or not the defendants acted
arbitrarily and capriciously is fraught with numerous
questions of fact, all of which are sharply disputed by
the parties.

The granting of the defendant's motion for

summary judgment is, therefore, error.
In order to avoid the taint of having their actions
declared arbitrary and capricious, the defendants must
show facts evidencing that; a fair hearing, or that any
hearing at all, was accorded to the plaintiff; that all
interested parties were given a reasonable opportunity
to be heard; that a quorum of the commission was present,
and that a majority agreed upon the determination that
was made {see 2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law; pp. 650652). Plaintiff's deposition, at pages 11 through 38,

painfully details the failure of the defendants to comply
with any of the foregoing requirements.
At page 31 of his deposition the plaintiff testified'
that "everybody started to walk out of the buildinq after
the zoning meeting."
he asked,

Speaking to one of the defendants

,

'f'i

"well aren't we going to have a hearing" (Plaint!',

deposition, p. 32).

I

These pages of the deposition show

around
the frustration of the plaintiff in trying to gather
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a conference table one or two of the commission members
to gain a listening ear.

Facts indicating the presence

of a quorum or a majority decision are nonexistent.
The significance of these factual matters is set
forth in the case of Bennett v. Price, 446 P.2d 419, 421
(Colo. 1968).

In the ~en~~~.!. case the Colorado Supreme

Court stated that:
[i)n determining whether any administrative
action is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable,
or an abuse of discretion, it is necessary
to look at the functions of the agency involved
and the totality of the factual background
in which the agency was functioning at the
time of the challenged act:
(emphasis added).
The necessity for the review of the factual background
of alleged arbitrary and capricious actions is further
set forth in K & L Distributors, Inc. v. Murkowski, 486
P.2d 351,357-8

(Alaska 1971).

In this case, the court

stated that they would review the matter to determine
that:
[n]o findings were made except on due notice
and opportunity to be heard, that the procedure
at the hearing was consistent with a fair
trial, and that the hearing was conducted
in such a way that there is an opportunity
for a court to ascertain whether the applicable
rules of law and procedure were observed.
The review of factual determinations becomes
a review to find whether the administrative
decision has passed beyond the lowest limit
of the permitted zone of reasonableness to
become capricious, arbitrary or confiscatory.
The facts, as viewed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, clearly show that the defendants acted
arbitrarily and capriciously.

At the very least, such
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facts are sharply disputed.
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly rulec1. that
summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should be granted
only with reluctance and with great caution.

Housely

v. Anaconda Co., 19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P.2d 390 (1967).
This principle is stated plainly in Frederick May & co.

v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962):
To sustain a summary judgment, the pleadings
evidence, admissions, and inferences must
show that there is not a genuine issue of
mater~al fact and that the winner is entitl~
to a Judgment as a matter of law.
Such showing·
must preclude, as a matter of law, all reasona~i:
possibility that the loser could win i f given
a trial.

I

Plaintiff respectfully submits that the granting of a
surrunary judgment, in the matter now before the Court,
is error.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's subdivision plat containing three

(3)

acre lots with one single family dwelling per lot compl~S
fully with the regulations and requirements under the GRF-1
zone.
Despite the qualification of plaintiff's subdivision
plat under the GRF-1 zoning regulations, the lower court
sustained defendant's motion for summary judgment without
·
· ·
explaining the grounds for its decision.

Such was in error.
. 1 to

,

I

Futhermore, significant disputes about facts, materia
defendant's·
plaintiff's claims, preclude the grdnting of the
motion for summary judgment.
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The court should have sustained plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment because:
(1)

Defendant's refusal to approve plaintiff's

subdivision plat, which complies fully with the GRF-1
zoning ordinance, is arbitrdry and capricious, and
(2)

Defendants' refusal to allow plaintiff

access to his administrative remedies is arbitrary and
capricious.
Respectfully submited this

:zlR

day of December,

19 79.

EARL S. SPAFFORD

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I .hereby certify that I mailed two copies of
the foregoing to K. L. Mciff attorney for the defendants
and respondents, at 151 North Main Street, Richfield,
Utah

84701, this

~/i~

day of December, 1979.
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